The United States and Cambodia signed one of the first legally binding trade “deals” resulting from negotiations that have followed the Trump Administration’s imposition of “reciprocal” tariffs (the other being an agreement with Malaysia). The U.S.-Cambodia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade maintains the 19 percent ad valorem reciprocal tariff rate applicable to imports from Cambodia while also providing for specified product carve-outs. In exchange, Cambodia has eliminated tariffs on certain U.S. products and committed to address certain non-tariff barriers. Once the agreement enters into force, interested parties may consider providing input with respect to Cambodia’s implementation of the reforms identified in the Agreement.
The First “Legally Binding” Trade Agreement
Other recently announced trade deals have taken the form of framework agreements that leave details to be addressed prior to signing. The agreement with Cambodia is different. It is labeled a trade “agreement” and signed by President Trump and Prime Minister Hun Manet of Cambodia. Although internal procedures necessary for the agreement to enter into force remain pending, USTR characterizes it as “legally binding.”
To be sure, members of Congress have questioned whether the Trump Administration’s trade dealmaking would require their advice and consent in the absence of Trade Promotion Authority. USTR Greer has taken the position that it would not. Importantly, as detailed below, U.S. tariff commitments in this Agreement are limited to reciprocal tariff concessions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) that would not require modification of the most-favored nation (MFN) rates in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) or other U.S. laws.
Significant Cambodian Concessions; Some Reciprocal Tariff Product Exclusions
The Agreement provides that the United States will apply a reciprocal tariff rate no higher than 19% on “originating goods of Cambodia,” the same tariff rate currently applicable to products of Cambodia per the reciprocal tariff modifications set forth in Executive Order 14326. This reciprocal tariff rate is in addition to the MFN duty rate in effect. In this regard, it is unlike the framework agreements with the European Union and Japan that implicate an interplay between reciprocal tariffs, Section 232 measures, and MFN duties. The Agreement does not affect the applicability of Section 232 measures on imports from Cambodia.
The United States will set the reciprocal tariff to zero for the large majority of products that appear on the list of “Potential Tariff Adjustments for Aligned Partners” annexed to Executive Order 14346, generally comprised of products that cannot be grown, mined, or naturally produced in the United States or grown, mined, or naturally produced in sufficient quantities in the United States to satisfy domestic demand; certain agricultural products; aircraft and aircraft parts; and non-patented articles for use in pharmaceutical applications.
These concessions are limited to “originating goods of Cambodia” a term that is not defined in the Agreement. This phrasing, which avoids the “products of” term of art used in U.S. customs practice for country of origin purposes, introduces the potential for rules of origin specific to this agreement. Indeed, the agreement provides that the United States and Cambodia “may establish rules of origin necessary” for the benefits of the agreement to accrue substantially to them and their nationals.
In return, Cambodia commits to apply revised customs duties on “originating goods of the United States” and to “not impose quotas on imports of originating goods of the United States” without U.S. agreement. Specifically, Schedule 1 to the Agreement provides the tariff subheadings for which customs duties “shall be eliminated entirely…on the date of entry into force of this Agreement.” The list is characterized as covering “100 percent of U.S. industrial goods and U.S. food and agricultural products exported to Cambodia.”
Non-Tariff Expansion of Market Access in Cambodia
The bulk of the Agreement describes Cambodia’s non-tariff concessions, many of which expand market access for American industries, including agriculture and automotive sectors. Cambodia’s key commitments are summarized below:
- Not restrict the importation of U.S. originating goods through the application of import licensing, particularly non-automatic licensing regimes.
- Allow U.S. originating goods (including automobiles, medical devices, and food or agricultural products) to enter Cambodia without additional conformity assessment requirements, upon complying with “applicable U.S. or international standards, U.S. technical regulations, or U.S. or international conformity assessment procedures.”
- Base sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures on science and risk assessment; do not deploy SPS measures as disguised restrictions on bilateral trade.
- Ensure transparency and fairness with respect to the protection or recognition of geographical indications. Permit the use of terms in connection with U.S. goods where there is no “quality, reputation, or other characteristic of the good that is essentially attributable to its geographical origin,” as well as the cheese and meat terms set forth in Annex II.
- Provide robust intellectual property protection standards and enforcement, including “ratifyi{ing} or acced{ing} to” thirteen intellectual property agreements named in Article 1.11 of Annex III and “fully implement{ing}” each. These are the same thirteen agreements identified in the U.S.-Malaysia Agreement.
- Refrain from imposing new barriers that provide less favorable treatment to U.S. services suppliers than the treatment afforded to domestic suppliers or suppliers from any third country, jurisdiction, or economy.
- Adopt and implement good regulatory practices at the central government level, essentially a series of administrative process improvements.
- Adopt and maintain environmental protections that are effectively enforced. Although the overarching guideline (“high levels of environmental protection”) lacks measurable standards, specific actions with respect to illegal logging, fishing, and wildlife trade are prescribed in Articles 1.19, 1.22, and 1.23 of Annex III.
- Within five years of the Agreement’s entry into force, implement technology solutions to allow digitized customs procedures for U.S. goods.
- Implement the World Customs Organization Guidelines for the Immediate Release of Consignments by Customs for immediate release of low-risk express shipments from the United States.
- Apply its national tariff nomenclature transparently and uniformly.
- Allow importers, producers, and authorized traders to electronically submit advance ruling applications and documentation to Cambodia’s General Department of Customs and Excise and improve the mechanism for resolving tariff classification disputes.
- Not impose discriminatory value-added taxes.
- Not impose customs duties on electronic transmissions.
- Not impose discriminatory digital service taxes or otherwise discriminate against U.S. digital services or U.S. products distributed digitally.
- Ensure the free transfer of data across trusted borders for the conduct of business.
- Protect proprietary data submitted by U.S. traders to the Cambodian customs authorities from unauthorized disclosure and ensure that digital logistics platforms used by Cambodian ports protect against, e.g., unauthorized data disclosure and data-access by other foreign governments.
- Not impose conditions or enforce any undertaking that would require U.S. persons to undergo forced technology transfer as a condition for doing business in Cambodia. However, an exception is provided for Cambodian regulatory bodies or judicial authorities to review source code or algorithms for a specific investigation, investigation, examination, enforcement action, or judicial proceeding.
- To the extent possible, exercise Cambodia’s rights over its state-owned or -controlled enterprises (SOEs) to act in accordance with commercial considerations in the purchase or sale or goods or services and refrain from discriminating against U.S. goods or services offered on comparable terms and conditions, including price.
- Refrain from “providing preferential subsidies to its goods-producing SOEs.”
- Upon request, investigate a U.S. allegation of “non-commercial assistance or subsidy” provided by Cambodia to a domestic manufacturing enterprise in Cambodia, provide information for “discussion and consideration,” and address “any significant distortive impacts” of the subsidies on bilateral trade. More generally, Cambodia commits to “expand cooperation and exchange information, as appropriate” related to their “respective antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings (to include circumvention inquiries).” If effectively implemented, this could streamline data-gathering in a variety of U.S. AD/CVD proceedings.
As a general matter, Cambodia has undertaken fewer commitments than were undertaken by Malaysia in the U.S.-Malaysia Agreement. There are, however, several undertakings unique to Cambodia, for example:
- A commitment to complete the market access process and reach agreement on a protocol to allow imports 18 months after submission of a request to allow market access to a U.S. horticultural product.
- Publishing and regularly updating official fees for public services covering all ministries and relevant agencies.
- A prohibition on introducing a digital competition regime that unreasonably or unjustifiably restricts U.S. commerce.
- A commitment to comply with “a repeatable process for removal cases of Cambodian nationals under section 243(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and accept the repatriation of all Cambodian nationals under removal orders by January 31, 2028.”
- Various measures aimed at “urgently end{ing} online scam operations targeting U.S. citizens and other victims.”
Extensive Labor Rights Commitments and Restrictions on Third-Country Agreements
Although both the U.S.-Malaysia and U.S.-Cambodia agreements generally oblige the U.S. trading partner to safeguard internationally recognized labor standards, the specific measures described in Annex III to Cambodia’s Agreement are more extensive.
With respect to Cambodia’s legal framework, the Trade Union Law must be amended to fully protect workers’ rights to freedom of association, collective bargaining, register trade unions, and strike. Cambodia’s labor laws must cover “substantially all workers, regardless of their employment status, and enterprise registration status, size, or sector.” And Cambodia must also publish guidelines to prohibit interference in legitimate and legal trade union activities as well as the use of violence and harassment against trade union organizers.
On the enforcement side, Cambodia is required to establish independent, neutral labor courts to hear labor disputes; maintain a fully funded Arbitration Council; and ensure a sufficiently resourced labor inspectorate. Given the U.S. Department of State’s 2024 findings with respect to the enforcement of labor laws, these undertakings are a significant step forward.
Additionally, some of Cambodia’s commitments under the Agreement purport to restrict or place conditions upon Cambodia entry into certain arrangements with third countries or international organizations. These include:
- Prohibiting agreements that include “non-scientific, discriminatory, or preferential technical standards; include third-country SPS measures that are incompatible with U.S. or international standards.”
- Requiring consultations with the United States “before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that jeopardizes essential U.S. interests.”
- Requiring Cambodia to “immediately and unconditionally” support multilateral adoption of a permanent moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions at the World Trade Organization (WTO).
- Providing for termination of the Agreement if Cambodia “enters into a new bilateral free trade agreement or preferential economic agreement that the United States considers undermines this Agreement or otherwise poses a material threat to economic or national security.”
Investments and Purchases
In the U.S. market, Cambodia has made an open-ended commitment to “facilitate job-creating, greenfield investment in the United States.” Air Cambodia has also agreed to finalize the purchase of ten Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft by October 31, 2025. These investment and purchase commitments, which are more limited than those in the U.S.-Malaysia Agreement, may implicitly recognize Cambodia’s status as a Least Developed Country (LDC), which is noted at several points throughout the Agreement.
In the Cambodian market, Cambodia will “allow and facilitate” (but not necessarily “promote”) investment by the United States in certain identified sectors: critical minerals, energy resources, power supply, telecommunications, transportation, and infrastructure services “on terms no less favorable than {Cambodia} accords its own investors in like circumstances.” For its part, as in the U.S.-Malaysia Agreement, the United States commits to working through the EXIM Bank and U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, if eligible, to “consider supporting investment financing in critical sectors in Cambodia in collaboration with U.S. private sector partners.” The U.S. also commits to “streamline and enhance” bilateral defense trade.
New Commitments on Trade Enforcement & Alignment
Consistent with other recently announced Framework Agreements, the U.S.-Cambodia Agreement covers matters beyond trade and investment, including security and strategic economic alignment. Cambodia is encouraged to mirror U.S. import and export restrictions in several ways, but the overall commitment to policy alignment is more limited than in the U.S.-Malaysia Agreement.
Special tariff and non-tariff actions
The United States will notify Cambodia of any tariff, quota, prohibition, fee, charge, or import restriction on a third country good or service. In response, Cambodia shall “regulate the importation of that good or service into its territory through similar measures as those of the United States in a manner that does not infringe on Cambodia’s sovereign interests.” Although a more tepid commitment than certain other Framework Agreements, it nevertheless sets the expectation that Cambodia will at least make some effort to align on what has become a broad array of security-based tariff measures by the United States.
For the shipbuilding sector, where the United States has introduced shipping fees pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301), the Agreement contains a specific provision. Cambodia commits to adopt “similar measures as those adopted by the United States,” consistent with Cambodia’s sovereign interests. Cambodia and the United States pledge to “discuss” the measures to be deployed. Interested U.S. entities may seek to inform those discussions.
Trade remedies alignment
Cambodia otherwise pledges, if requested by the United States and “consistent with its sovereign interests,” to address “unfair practices” of companies “owned or controlled by third countries” that result in the export of “below-market price goods to the United States,” “increased exports of such goods to the United States,” “a reduction in U.S. exports to Cambodia,” or “a reduction in U.S. exports to third-country markets.” In essence, this obliges Cambodia to help address problems of dumping and overcapacity tied to operations in Cambodia that may be linked to entities in, e.g., the People’s Republic of China, although the “sovereign interests” proviso may limit the provision’s reach in practice.
Transshipment enforcement
With respect to transshipment, a consistent focus of the second Trump Administration’s negotiations and something the first Trump Administration raised with Cambodia, Cambodia agrees to “adopt and effectively enforce measures to combat practices that evade or circumvent” U.S. tariffs, and to “enter into a duty evasion cooperation agreement” with the United States. At present, however, the cooperation agreement itself does not appear among the Agreement’s annexes. In addition to addressing a U.S. priority, this would also appear to be a practical necessity to realize the agreement’s stated intention for its benefits to flow to the signatory countries, rather than third parties.
Forced labor enforcement
Cambodia will adopt and “effectively implement” a prohibition on the importation of goods produced by forced labor and “may acknowledge” U.S. forced labor determinations under 19 U.S.C. § 1307 and prohibit importation of goods from companies identified in such determinations. Forced labor has been a recurring topic of interest in the Trump Administration’s 2025 trade policy, having featured in several Framework Agreements as well as the recent Section 301 determination regarding Nicaragua.
Export controls and sanctions policies
With respect to export controls, Cambodia promises to “align with relevant U.S. export controls on a case-by-case basis, based on requests from the United States, and ensure that its companies do not backfill or undermine these controls.” However, the Agreement recognizes that Cambodia still needs to “develop domestic export control systems and enforcement mechanisms, including by establishing and implementing criminal penalties.” To enhance U.S. enforcement of its own export controls, Cambodia furthermore commits to “screen and share its customs and transaction data related to U.S.-origin or U.S.-controlled items” and “share transactions identified as being of concern with U.S. authorities.”
As for sanctions, Cambodia will “cooperate with” the United States “with a view to restricting transactions of its nationals with third-country individuals and entities” on U.S. sanctions lists. Finally, if requested by the United States, Cambodia commits to “cooperate in providing information available to Cambodia, subject to a mutually agreed protocol for confidential information, about investment activity in its territory by third countries with a view toward increasing transparency and cooperation with the United States.” Elsewhere, Cambodia states that it will “collaborate with the United States to address cybersecurity challenges.”
The United States offers some additional carrots in the realm of security alignment, promising to account for Cambodia’s cooperation in “address{ing} shared national and economic security issues” in administering U.S. export controls, and other measures. Unlike the U.S.-Malaysia Agreement, “investment reviews” is not specifically named in the U.S.-Cambodia Agreement.
A Model for Other Agreements with Southeast Asia, With Limitations
On October 26, 2025, the United States signed separate bilateral agreements with both Malaysia and Cambodia. The main texts of those agreements are nearly identical in their structure. Many of their provisions are materially identical in substance, but meaningful distinctions reflect differences in the negotiating priorities and domestic legal system of each country. For example, whereas Article 5.2 commits Cambodia to “align with relevant U.S. export controls on a case-by-case basis, based on requests from the United States,” the same article of the U.S.-Malaysia Agreement provides that Malaysia will “align with all unilateral export controls in force by the United States.” Moreover, Annexes appended to the main text identify additional commitments or provide greater detail with respect to the commitments set forth in the main text. These Annexes differ more significantly from agreement to agreement.
Operationally, these similar-but-adjustable agreements provide a notional template for future U.S. dealmaking texts. Indeed, a relatively high degree of standardization may be a practical necessity for the United States, given how many simultaneous negotiations are underway. On the other hand, the Agreements notably omit any mention of tariffs pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232). Neither Cambodia nor Malaysia appears to have secured concessions with respect to those tariff regimes. Many other U.S. trading partners with which the United States has yet to conclude an agreement (or framework agreement) have an essential interest in adjusting the way that Section 232 tariff regimes apply to their exports.
A Possible Role for Interested Parties in Enforcement
If effectively implemented, the Agreement may anchor a model that pairs market liberalization and access to strategic resources with closer alignment on trade and investment controls. Over time, accountability and enforceability will be key questions. Cambodia has committed to simultaneous reforms in a variety of sectors. The United States will need to monitor compliance. While the Agreement contains no dispute settlement provisions, Article 7.3 requires consultations “when practicable” to address noncompliance.
Although lacking the formal procedures as contained, for example, in the USMCA Agreement concerning the Rapid-Response Labor Mechanism, there may be a role for interested parties to contribute to compliance. From a practical standpoint, USTR is simultaneously pursuing a variety of initiatives and effective enforcement of this Agreement will require monitoring a variety of different issue areas. The more Agreements are finalized, the more countries and issue areas may require such monitoring. To ensure efficient and effective use of limited government resources, U.S. entities with an interest in Cambodia’s implementation of a given provision of the agreement should consider engaging with USTR to identify unresolved problems or compliance issues. For example, this may include transshipment, antidumping or countervailing duty circumvention, exports at below market prices driven by China-linked SOEs operating in Cambodia, or labor policy issues.
Should consultations fail to yield resolution, enforcement ultimately falls to U.S. “action in accordance with applicable domestic law.” At present, that could include, e.g., the imposition of tariffs pursuant to IEEPA, Section 232, or Section 301. This would appear to create a de facto “snapback” enforcement mechanism on the U.S. side, although Section 232 and Section 301 each has more procedural requirements than IEEPA.
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